The proximity risk model offers one possible explanation of honest signalling of aggressive 21 intent in biology. This model assumes that the probability of successful attack is a function of 22 the distance between the contestants and that this distance can be correctly estimated. This 23 later assumption may not hold in nature where contestants have to estimate this distance under 24 noisy conditions. Here I investigate with the help of a game theoretical model whether short-25 range ranging signals can be evolutionarily stable under such conditions. These signals can 26 help the opponent to estimate the correct distance, thus they can promote honest signalling of 27 intentions. Here I show that ranging signals that help the estimation of distance between 28 opponents can be evolutionarily stable. However, such help only benefits those individuals 29 who are able and willing to attack. As a result, ranging signals in themselves are an honest cue 30 of proximity and in turn they are honest cues of aggressive intent. I give an example: "soft-31 song" in birds, and I discuss the predictions of the model. 32 33 Keywords: ranging signals, proximity risk, threat displays, aggressive communication, honest 34 signalling 35 3 1. Background 36
in the model is that potential cheaters should not be able to flee the conflict even if they want 48 to do so. The reason behind this assumption was unexplained in the original formulation. Later 49 'proximity risk' was proposed as a potential proximate mechanism by Számadó [4] . The idea 50 of the proximity risk model is that there is a distance within which potential cheaters cannot get 51 away with bluffing even if they want to do so, and this is the distance within which threat 52 displays are expected to be honest [4] . 53
Számadó's [4] model assumes that contestants are able to judge the distance perfectly. 54
However, this is rarely the case in nature: errors of estimation are expected to happen. Such 55 errors in turn might decrease the fitness of an individual if it picks the wrong strategy as a 56 function of the distance. This applies to the opponent as well, in fact errors of the opponent 57 might decrease the fitness of the ego. Here I propose that it could be the interest of the ego to 58 help the opponent to estimate the distance correctly, in order to avoid costly mistakes of the 59 opponent. I call such signals as 'short-range ranging signals' (SRRS) since the function of these 4 signals is to help with the estimation of range between opponents. Please note, that the form 61 and function of these signals can be different than the "traditional" ranging signals investigated 62 in the context of territorial bird song (i.e. long-distance broadcast displays [5] [6] [7] [8] for an indivisible resource. The game has three stages: (i) at the first stage Nature picks the state 69 of the contestants, which can be weak (W) or strong (S); (ii) at the second stage the contestants 70 can chose between two cost-free signals A or B; finally (iii) at stage three the contestants can 71 either flee (F), attack (A) or wait for the opponent to flee and attack only if the opponent stays 72 to fight (cond.A). Figure 1 depicts the structure of the game (after [9]). Let V denote the value 73 of the resource. The cost of fighting depends on the strength of the ego and that of the opponent; 74 accordingly, there are four cost parameters: CWW, CWS, CSW and CSS. The following relation is 75 assumed to hold between these parameters: CWS > CWW, CSS > CSW. On top of the cost of fighting 76 there are other potential costs as well: (i) attacking a fleeing opponent (FA), (ii) pausing when 77 the opponent attacks (Fp), and finally there is a cost to flee (Ff). Here we assume that the strategy of an individual is defined as playing the honest strategy 98 (SA) with probability 1-p(x) and playing SB with probability p(x) as a function distance (x). 99 100 3. Results There is a region in the proximity risk model where a mixed strategy (SM) is an 108 evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This mixed ESS is supported by cheater (SB) and honest 109 (SA) pure strategies, where the probability of playing these strategies are p and 1-p respectively. 110
The equilibrium ratio of mixing is given by the following equation whereas the red line shows the threshold above which there is no honest communication. The 119 mixed strategy SM is an ESS between these thresholds. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium 120 proportion of cheaters (p*) in this region (see [4] ). 121 122 ESS conditions of ranging signals in the proximity risk model 123
Let's assume that estimating the distance without any help is prone to errors. Let's 124 further assume a population where individuals give a ranging signal (Rs) to help the opponent 125 to estimate distance x. At the equilibrium both opponent will use this signal; both of them will 126 estimate the distance correctly, thus they both will play p*. Can this equilibrium be invaded by 7 a mutant strategy that does not use Rs? The use of Rs to be ESS the following condition must 128 hold [11] : 129
Since opponents of individuals using Rs can estimate distance correctly (thus they will 133 play p*), whereas opponents of individuals not giving Rs cannot do so (hence will play ≠ 134 * ), Eq.3 implies: 135 E( * , * ) > E( * , ).
( 5) 136 Then the equilibrium condition (Eq. 5) can be expressed with these terms as follows: 137
After rearrangement the ESS condition of short-range ranging signals is as follows: 139
Where the fitness of an individual playing p* against individuals playing the honest strategy 142 (SA) is as follows: 143
The fitness of an individual playing p* against individuals playing the cheater strategy (SB) is 145 as follows: 146 There are two obvious cases: (i) either p>p*, then the following inequality has to hold: 150 E( * , 0) > E( * , 1) (10) 151
That is, if the proportion of cheaters is higher as specified by the mixed strategy (p>p*), then 152 individuals playing the mixed strategy against the honest type has to do better than individuals 153 playing the mixed strategy against the cheater type. This condition will hold as long as: 154
(ii) In the second case p<p*, then the following inequality has to hold: 156 E( * , 0) < E( * , 1).
( 11) 157 That is, if the proportion of cheaters is lower as specified by the mixed strategy (p<p*), then 158 individuals playing the mixed strategy against the cheater type has to do better than individuals 159 playing the mixed strategy against the honest type. 160
Let's define ∆ ( * ) as a difference in fitness when playing against an opponent playing 161 the equilibrium probability of mixing and an opponent playing an out-of-equilibrium mixing: 162
Which in turn is the left-hand side of Eq. 7, thus: 164
Let's define ∆ as a fitness difference between playing honest and dishonest opponent, while 166 the ego plays p*: 167
Finally, let's further define ∆ as follows: 169 ∆ = * − .
(15) 170 ∆ can be calculated by substituting Eqs. 8, 9 and it results the following equation: 171
(16) 172 Figure 4 shows an example for the error of estimating the difference between opponents 173 (xe). Figure 5 .A shows an example for ∆ . It is clear that ∆ is always positive, which means 174 that it is always more beneficial to play against the honest type than the cheater type. Fig 5.B  175 shows the change in the frequency of cheaters (∆ ) as a result of this error of estimation. It is 176 clear that this error of estimation has the greatest effect in the region where the mixed strategy 177 is the ESS. Fig 5. B also shows that the proportion of cheaters is increased at close range and 178 decreased at mid-range compared to the ESS mixing ratio. Combining the insights of Fig. 5 .A 179 and 5.B predicts that if opponents underestimate the probability of a successful attack (due to 180 overestimating distance, e.g. Fig. 5 .B close distance), thus they are likely to cheat with a higher 181 probability than the ESS mixing ratio, then it is the interest of the ego to help them to make a 182 correct estimation so that the opponent's choice to play the honest type increased, which is 183 beneficial to the ego (i.e. Fig.5.B ). Figure 5 .C, shows this effect, i.e. it shows ∆ ( * ). There 184 are two regions where playing p* has higher fitness than a mutant (i.e. regions where p* is an 185 ESS): (i) the first region is at low value of resource and large distance; (ii) whereas the second 186 region is at high value of resource and low distance. Assuming that territorial disputes represent 187 high value of resource and individuals are aware of the fact that they are fighting for a territory, 188 it is clear that the use of ranging displays (Rs) is an honest cue of proximity in this region. In 189 other words, individuals receiving a ranging display from the opponent contesting a resource 190 of high value can be certain that the opponent is close enough to strike with a high success rate. 191 Figure 6 shows examples of ∆ (Fig.6. A,B and C) and the corresponding ∆ ( * ) 192 ( Fig.6 . D,E and F) values for different estimates of error (A,D σ =5; B,E σ =15, C,F σ =25). It 193 clear that error prone estimation of distance mostly affects the zone of mixed cheating (i.e. the 194 zone between the dashed lines). The larger the error the larger this zone. Also it starts to have 195 an effect on the honest zone at higher resource values (Fig 6.F) . So far it was assumed that 196 ranging signals are cost-free. However, introducing a small cost (cR) into Eq.7 (left-hand side) 197 makes the first region (low value of resource, high distance) mostly disappear (depending on 198 the value of cost and on the value of error). scenario (e.g. Fig 6.H) . Figure 6 .G also shows that the use of Rs might not be an ESS when Rs 201 is costly if the error of estimating the distance is small. 202 203
Discussion

204
I have shown that the use of ranging signals is evolutionarily stable when there is an 205 error of estimating the distance between the two opponents. Cost-free ranging signals are an 206 honest cue of aggressive intentions when the (i) value of the resource is low and the distance 207 between the opponents is high, or the (ii) value is high and the distance is low (Fig. 5.C) . 208
Assuming that animals are aware of the value of resource they are competing for then the use 209 of ranging signal is an honest cue of low distance in case of high value of contested resource. 210
A small production cost of ranging signals eliminates the first region; thus, the use of ranging 211 signal is an honest cue of low distance regardless of the value of the resource (Fig. 6.H) . The 212 intuitive interpretation of this result is that uncertainty of estimating the distance benefits 213 cheaters, thus only honest individuals are expected to reduce it. Accordingly, if I see my 214 opponent to help me to reduce the uncertainty regarding the estimation of distance between the 215 two of us then it is honest cue of my opponent's aggressive intentions. 216
Please note that the model's assumption and thus the current logic applies to all 217 situations where individuals have some error prone estimation of the distance. This estimation 218 need not be vocal only, so that the opponents can have a visual line of sight, yet it would not 219 exclude the current mechanism as long as the visual judgement of distance is not perfect. 220 "Soft songs" are low-amplitude songs or calls observed in a number of species, mostly in 221 aggressive context [12] . Empirical studies shown that out of a number of song types associated 222 [20] . Soft call, a low amplitude call, which appears to 227 be the equivalent of soft song is a reliable signal of aggression in corncrakes (Crex crex) [21, 228 22 ]. There has been a long debate on the functions of soft song and whether soft song is the best 229 suited for short-range ranging or not [13, 18, 23, 24] . There is no room to give justice to this 230 debate here. Accordingly, the goal is not to decide the debate, just to point out that from a purely 231 theoretical point of view soft-song fits the function of SRRS proposed in the model. Whether 232 this is the case in nature or not, is an empirical issue. The use of SRSS is evolutionarily stable (i) when the value of the resource is low and the 238 distance between the opponents is high, or (ii) when the value of the resource is high and the 239 distance is low; additionally a small cost of displays can eliminate the first region. 240
(1) SRRS functions in the context of aggressive communication. The majority of 241 empirical examples of soft song is in the context of aggressive communication ([13-21] ). This 242 prediction is strongly supported. 243
(2) SRRS is a reliable predictor of attack. This prediction has a strong support as well. 244
Soft song is the most reliable indicator of attack ([13, 14, 18] suggest that the main function of binocular vision is contrast recognition, guiding of bill 254 movement and precision grip. If so, simply being in close range and having a line of sight need 255 not resolve the uncertainty of the estimation of distance between opponents. 256 (4) SRSS functions to reduce the level of noise, i.e. it serves as a signal of proximity. 257 This is the most debated point (see [18, 23] vs. [24] ). Yet, this seems to be an unresolved debate, 258 because there is no strong empirical evidence offered pro or contra. There is only a short verbal 259 argument presented in Ballentine at al. [18] which questions whether soft-song is the best choice 260 at close range to reduce uncertainty (p. 700): "Because of the way that sound attenuates with 261 distance, a song that is of low amplitude when it reaches the receiver may be a soft song 262 produced nearby or a broadcast song produced at a greater distance, whereas a song that is of 263 high amplitude when it reaches the receiver is unambiguously a song produced in close 264 proximity." Unfortunately, this claim is being repeated, and presented as evidence, in subsequent publications without any empirical evidence (Searcy et al. [23] ; p. 1215): "Loud 266 song produced close to a receiver, however, is actually a less ambiguous signal of proximity 267 than is a low-amplitude song (Ballentine et al. 2008) . Because all sounds attenuate with 268 distance, a song that is still loud when it reaches the receiver must have been produced nearby, 269 whereas a song that is of low amplitude when it reaches the receiver could be a soft song 270 produced nearby or a louder one produced further away." On the other hand, a recent empirical 271 result found that the structure of soft song is adopted to short range communication evidence on the fitness cost of using soft-song. The general assumption is that the production 278 cost is low [15, 18, 32] . The whole soft-song "paradox" started out because soft-song seems to 279 be a cheap yet reliable signal, which runs contrary to predictions of the Handicap Principle or 280 "costly signalling theory" [33, 34] , which is still the dominant paradigm of honest signalling in 281 biology. As Anderson and her colleagues ([32] , pp. 1273) write: "It is not clear what if any cost 282 acts to maintain the reliability of soft song as a signal of aggressive intent in song sparrows". 283
Akcay at al. [17] ask the same question: "So how can a signal that is apparently not costly to 284 produce be a reliable aggressive signal?" (pp. 380). "Receiver-retaliation rule" or "Receiver-285 dependent cost" was proposed as a solution to this problem [15, 17, 18, 24] , but no details and 286 no model was offered as how such "retaliation-cost" would work. The current model can 287 highlight these missing details and it can explain how a low production cost signal of aggressive 288 intent can be reliable and evolutionarily stable. 289 (5) The stability conditions of SRRS II.: value of the resource and distance between 290 opponents. These points seems to be much less controversial than the previous ones. Most 291 examples of soft-song observed in territorial disputes [13-21] -i.e. high value of resource-and 292 at close range. These conditions fit the second region identified by the current model. 293
All in all, helping the opponent to make a correct judgment of distance can be beneficial 294 for the ego. Giving such signal is a sign of confidence and aggressive intentions since the 295 reduction of uncertainty only benefits an honest signaller. Signals that evolved for this function 296 expected to have reduced range. 297 
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